Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round Ii by Bainbridge, Stephen M.




Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate
Governance Round Ii
Stephen M. Bainbridge
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation






Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate 
Governance Round II 
Stephen M. Bainbridge† 
To say that the Naughts was a tumultuous decade for the 
United States and global economies flirts with gross under-
statement. The decade opened with the bursting of the tech- 
stock bubble in March 2000.1 Coupled with a sharp decline in 
consumer spending, rising energy prices, and the economic fall-
out of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the result was 
an extended bear market and a lengthy recession. Unemploy-
ment rose from 3.9 percent in December 2000 to 4.9 percent in 
August 2001 and eventually peaked at 6.3 percent in June 
2003.2 As for the stock market, it generated negative returns 
every year from 2000 to 2002, which was the first three-year 
consecutive decline since the Great Depression of the 1930s.3 
The tumult was not exclusively economic, however. The 
now infamous scandal at Enron turned out not to be an isolated 
case, as news of corporate shenanigans at companies like 
WorldCom, Global Crossing, Tyco, Adelphia, and others soon 
followed.4 New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer launched 
an investigation into conflicts of interest on the part of stock 
 
†  William D. Warren Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. Copyright 
© 2011 by Stephen M. Bainbridge. 
 1. DAVID M. JONES, UNLOCKING THE SECRETS OF THE FED, at xi (2002). 
 2. N. GREGORY MANKIW, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 535 (5th ed. 2008). 
 3. ROY C. SMITH, PAPER FORTUNES: WALL STREET, WHERE IT’S BEEN 
AND WHERE IT’S GOING 272 (2010). 
 4. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 640–41 
(2010) (noting the SEC’s failure to “recognize the fraud and attendant abuses 
at Enron in 2001, shortly followed by similar problems at Adelphia, 
WorldCom, Global Crossings, Tyco, and a host of other companies”). 
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market analysts.5 Spitzer also turned up problems at many 
large mutual funds.6 
In response to public outrage prompted by stock market 
losses and seemingly rampant fraud, Congress passed the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 20027 (SOX).8 When President George W. 
Bush signed the Act later that month, he praised it for making 
“the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices 
since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”9 In contrast, 
however, Yale law professor Roberta Romano slammed SOX as 
“quack corporate governance.”10 
Romano singled out four of SOX’s provisions for detailed 
criticism: 
 
1. SOX section 301 mandates that all public corporations must have 
an audit committee comprised exclusively of independent directors, 
even though the empirical evidence on the efficacy of director inde-
pendence in general and audit committee composition in specific was, 
at best, mixed.11 
2. Section 201 prohibits accounting firms from providing a wide 
range of nonaudit services to public corporations they audit, even 
 
 5. See Sung Hui Kim, Lawyer Exceptionalism in the Gatekeeping Wars, 
63 SMU L. REV. 73, 127 n.339 (2010) (“In 2002, New York Attorney General 
Eliot Spitzer announced that high-profile securities analysts had publicly rec-
ommended that investors buy stocks that they had privately disparaged, even 
referring to touted stocks as ‘dogs’ or ‘junk’ in internal e-mails.”). 
 6. See Macey, supra note 4, at 641 (noting that “Eliot Spitzer issued 
scathing attacks on the SEC’s dismal performance in regulating mutual fund 
abuses”). 
 7. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 8. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in 
Washington: Some Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 
BUS. LAW. 1079, 1081 (2008) (describing SOX as “crisis-inspired legislation 
that made clear that if investor outrage was widespread enough, even a Re-
publican-controlled Congress was prepared to enact federal laws affecting cor-
porate governance”). 
 9. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at A1, available at 2002 WLNR 4020235. 
 10. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). As should be apparent, the 
title of my Article is an homage to what Judge Frank Easterbrook called Ro-
mano’s “wonderful article.” Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in 
Corporate Governance, 95 VA. L. REV. 685, 694 (2009). But see Robert A. Pren-
tice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How 
Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 1844 (2007) (disputing Ro-
mano’s claims: “(1) that Congress can do substantial harm when it legislates 
in haste and did so when passing SOX, and (2) that four key corporate govern-
ance provisions of SOX were unsupported by empirical academic literature”). 
 11. Romano, supra note 10, at 1529–33. 
  
2011] QUACK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ROUND II 1781 
 
though the weight of the evidence was that provision of such services 
did not degrade audit quality.12 
3. Section 402(a) prohibits most loans by corporations to their execu-
tives, even though such “loans in many cases appear to serve their 
purpose of increasing managerial stock ownership, thereby aligning 
managers’ and shareholders’ interests.”13 
4. Sections 302 and 906 require the chief executive officer (CEO) and 
chief financial officer (CFO) to certify their firm’s SEC filings, even 
though the evidence as to whether such certifications provide useful 
information to investors is ambiguous.14 
 
As it turned out, none of these provisions proved to be SOX’s 
most contentious mandate. Instead, that dubious honor fell to 
section 404’s requirement that management and the firm’s out-
side auditor certify the effectiveness of the company’s internal 
controls over financial reporting.15  
When SOX was adopted neither Congress nor the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) appreciated just how 
costly it would prove. The SEC estimated that the average cost 
of complying with section 404 would be approximately 
$91,000.16 As it turned out, a 2005 survey put the direct cost of 
complying with section 404 in its first year at $7.3 million for 
large accelerated filers and $1.5 million for accelerated filers.17 
“First-year implementation costs for larger companies were 
 
 12. Id. at 1533–37. 
 13. Id. at 1539. 
 14. Id. at 1540–43. 
 15. SOX section 404(a) ordered the SEC to adopt rules requiring reporting 
companies to include in their annual reports a statement of management’s re-
sponsibility for “establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control 
structure and procedures for financial reporting” and “an assessment, as of the 
end of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the in-
ternal control structure and procedures of the issuer, for financial reporting.” 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404(a)(1)–(2), 116 Stat. 
745, 789. Section 404(b) required that the company’s independent auditors at-
test to and report on management’s assessment. Id. § 404(b). The Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010), permanently exempted nonaccelerated filers from com-
pliance with section 404(b). Meredith P. Burbank, Dodd-Frank Act Permanent-
ly Exempts Non-Accelerated Filers from SOX Auditor Attestation Requirement, 
WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDBRIDGE & RICE (July 29, 2010), http://www.wcsr.com/ 
resources/pdfs/cs072910.pdf. The Act further “directs the SEC to conduct a 
study within the next nine months to determine how the burden of compliance 
with section 404(b) could be reduced for companies with market capitaliza-
tions between $75 million and $250 million.” Id. 
 16. Joseph A. Grundfest & Steven E. Bochner, Fixing 404, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 1643, 1645 (2007). 
 17. Id. 
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thus eighty times greater than the SEC had estimated, and six-
teen times greater than estimated for smaller companies.”18 
Second-year compliance costs dropped, although surveys 
report widely differing estimates of the extent of the drop.19 Ac-
cording to all the surveys, however, second-year compliance 
costs remained many times greater than the SEC’s estimate of 
first-year costs.20 “Absent fundamental reform, the third, 
fourth, and fifth rounds are also likely to cost too much, ad in-
finitum.”21 
SOX was not a one-off event. To the contrary, it was a fair-
ly standard example of the boom-bust-regulate pattern that 
characterizes U.S. federal regulation of corporate governance. 
In a pattern that can be traced back at least to England in the 
late 1600s, major new corporate regulation has tended to follow 
market turmoil.22 
When the economy suffered through an even worse patch 
at the end of the decade, it was thus perfectly predictable that 
another round of regulation would be forthcoming. The story of 
the housing bubble’s burst, the subprime mortgage crisis, and 
the Great Recession is far too complex to recount herein.23 Suf-
fice it to say that, as was the case with SOX, populist outrage 
motivated Congress to pass the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
 
 18. Id. at 1645–46. Reporting companies are those issuers registered with 
the SEC pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Large accelerated 
filers are those reporting companies with a market float of $700 million or 
more. Accelerated filers are those reporting companies having a float of at 
least $75 million, but less than $700 million. Nonaccelerated filers are report-
ing companies with a float of less than $75 million. The reference to accelera-
tion reflects that the first two categories of companies have a reduced amount 
of time following the end of a fiscal quarter or year to file their quarterly and 
annual reports. See generally Mary E.T. Beach, Continuous Reporting Re-
quirements Under the Exchange Act of 1934, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 
(2010) (discussing these terms). 
 19. See Grundfest & Bochner, supra note 16, at 1646 (discussing the  
surveys).  
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1647. The SEC and the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) have undertaken a number of efforts aimed at reducing the 
costs associated with section 404 compliance. See generally Lawrence A. Cun-
ningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial Regula-
tion: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 39, 55 n.60 (2009) (detailing such efforts). 
 22. See STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: 
CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690–1860, at 9 (1998) (explaining that 
“new regulation tended to come immediately after price declines”). 
 23. For an overview, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF 
CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009). 
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Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank or the 
Dodd-Frank Act).24 
Although Dodd-Frank’s 2319 pages dwarf SOX in both size 
and scope, most of the Act deals with issues other than corpo-
rate governance. The key provisions pertinent to our inquiry 
are six in number: 
 
1. Section 951’s so-called say-on-pay mandate, requiring periodic 
shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation. 
2. Section 952’s mandate that the compensation committees of re-
porting companies must be fully independent and that those commit-
tees be given certain specified oversight responsibilities. 
3. Section 953’s direction that the SEC require companies to provide 
additional disclosures with respect to executive compensation. 
4. Section 954’s expansion of SOX’s rules regarding clawbacks of ex-
ecutive compensation. 
5. Section 971’s affirmation that the SEC has authority to promul-
gate a so-called shareholder access rule pursuant to which sharehold-
ers would be allowed to use the company’s proxy statement to nomi-
nate candidates to the board of directors. 
6. Section 972’s requirement that companies disclose whether the 
same person holds both the CEO and chairman of the board positions 
and why they either do or do not do so. 
 
The question before us is whether Dodd-Frank’s corporate gov-
ernance provisions, like those of SOX, are mere quackery. 
Part I of this Article focuses on the problem of quack corpo-
rate governance regulation in the abstract. What are the defin-
ing characteristics of a quack law? Why would Congress adopt 
such laws? What are the consequences of such laws for compa-
nies, investors, and the economy as a whole? 
Part II examines the six provisions of Dodd-Frank listed 
above. It will argue that some of them are meaningless symbol-
ism but that others are likely to have serious adverse conse-
quences. Hence, Part II argues, Dodd-Frank is to corporate gov-
ernance as quackery is to medical practice. 
Part III concludes by asking whether there is anything 
that can be done to prevent future quack corporate governance 
laws. It argues that the best alternative would be some form of 
a prophylactic barrier pursuant to which Congress precommits 
 
 24. See Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time 
of Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309, 333 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1617890 (opining that “the emergence of so thoroughly shareholder-
centric a set of proposals in the wake of the crisis is best understood as one re-
flection of a much broader populist backlash against managers”). 
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to refraining from emergency post-bubble legislation. Part III 
concludes, however, that Congress is unlikely to do so. It seems 
likely that quackery in federal regulation of corporate govern-
ance is subject to a ratchet effect. State legislators therefore 
need to develop defensive strategies designed to limit the op-
portunities for further federal intervention. 
I.  BUBBLE LAWS   
A. REGULATORS AND INTEREST GROUPS 
Although the federal government has been an active regu-
lator of corporate governance since at least the New Deal, the 
core remains a matter of state corporate law. It is state law, for 
example, that determines the rights of shareholders, “including 
. . . the voting rights of shareholders.”25 Likewise, “the first 
place one must look to determine the powers of corporate direc-
tors is in the relevant State’s corporation law. ‘Corporations are 
creatures of state law’ and it is state law which is the font of 
corporate directors’ powers.”26 As the predominant state of in-
corporation for public corporations, of course, Delaware is the 
leading regulator of corporate governance. 
The division of responsibility between the states and the 
federal government is contentious because there are a number 
of interest groups with skin in the corporate governance game. 
These include corporate managers, shareholders, unions, con-
sumers, NGOs, and anticorporate populists.27 In Delaware, 
however, most of these groups are relatively powerless. In-
stead, the dominant interest group in Delaware is the bar: 
The bar is small, discrete, and highly organized. Its members tend to 
have a large personal stake in the subject matter of the regulation. 
They also tend to be more wealthy than other groups and to have 
good political connections. Indeed, many members of the Delaware 
legislature are themselves members of the bar. Such legislators tend 
to be represented disproportionately on legislative committees that 
draft the provisions of the Delaware Corporation Code.28 
 
 25. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987). 
 26. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) (citations omitted). 
 27. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2500, 2517 
(2005).  
 28. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group 
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 506 (1987). 
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In addition, Delaware tends to be highly sensitive to the inter-
ests of managers and investors.29 Other interest groups are 
generally powerless in Delaware.30 
In contrast, at the federal level, these other interest groups 
have considerable influence, diluting the power of the interests 
that dominate Delaware.31 In particular, Washington is subject 
to national public opinion and populist sentiments from which 
Dover is largely insulated.32 
In ordinary times, Washington typically has more impor-
tant issues on its plate than corporate governance.33 In a bub-
ble period, moreover, federal regulatory action is even less like-
ly because interest groups like shareholders and consumers 
may be lulled into inaction by the seemingly ever-rising value 
of their portfolios.34 At the same time, however, the stage is be-
ing set for a post-bubble burst of regulation. In the euphoria as-
sociated with a bubble, regulators and private gatekeepers tend 
to let their guard down, potential fraudsters see an explosion of 
opportunities, and investors become both more greedy and 
trusting.35 The net effect is a boom in fraud during bubbles, es-
pecially toward the end, when everybody is trying to keep the 
music going. When the bubble inevitably bursts, investigators 
reviewing the rubble begin to turn up evidence of speculative 
excess and even outright, rampant fraud.36 Investors burnt by 
losses from the breaking of the bubble and outraged by evi-
dence of misconduct by corporate insiders and financial bigwigs 
create populist pressure for new regulation.37 
 
 29. Roe, supra note 27, at 2500. 
 30. Id. at 2501; see also Macey & Miller, supra note 28, at 490 (“Because 
the physical assets of most large Delaware corporations are located in other 
states, Delaware lawmakers ordinarily are not subject to pressures from un-
ions, environmental groups, local communities, or other special interests asso-
ciated with the corporation’s physical plant or assets.”). 
 31. Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 17 (2009). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 8. 
 34. Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 79 (2003). 
 35. See generally Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the 
Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393 (2006) (dis-
cussing the relationship between bubbles and fraud). 
 36. See generally CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND 
CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 73–90 (4th ed. 2000) (discussing 
the fallout of bubbles). 
 37. See Ribstein, supra note 34, at 79 (explaining that after a crash, re-
formers can draw on populism and envy of the rich). 
  
1786 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1779 
 
It is in the post-bubble environment, “when scandals and 
economic reversals occur” and “when corporate transactions 
grab the attention of the American public and the U.S. Con-
gress,” that Congress often acts.38 Because the venue for post-
bubble regulatory action shifts from Dover to Washington, in-
terest groups frozen out of the Delaware process participate 
meaningfully in the legislative or rulemaking processes. Be-
cause such periods typically involve an upswing in populist an-
ger and accompanying intense public pressure for action, they 
offer “windows of opportunity to well-positioned policy entre-
preneurs to market their preferred, ready-made solutions when 
there is little time for reflective deliberation.”39 Larry Ribstein 
and Roberta Romano have independently demonstrated that 
this pattern is a reoccurring phenomenon in American law, 
going back even before the New Deal.40 Indeed, according to 
Stuart Banner, the same pattern of boom, bust, and regulation 
can be seen far back into the nineteenth century.41 
Banner contends that the reason for the association is that deep-
seated popular suspicion of speculation comes in bad financial times 
to dominate otherwise popular support for markets, resulting in the 
expansion of regulation. That is to say, financial exigencies embolden 
critics of markets to push their regulatory agenda. They are able to 
play on the strand of popular opinion that is hostile to speculation 
and markets because the general public is more amenable to regula-
tion after experiencing financial losses.42 
SOX was merely the latest iteration of this process,43 at least 
until Dodd-Frank came along. 
B. QUACK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE ECONOMY 
Bubble laws tend to be adopted in a hurry, as was the case 
with SOX.44 As we have seen, the pressure of time tends to give 
advantages to interest groups and other policy entrepreneurs 
who have prepackaged purported solutions that can be readily 
adapted into legislative form. Hence, for example, many of 
SOX’s provisions were “recycled ideas” that had been “advo-
cated for quite some time by corporate governance entrepre-
 
 38. Roe, supra note 31, at 8. 
 39. Romano, supra note 10, at 1591. 
 40. Ribstein, supra note 34, at 83–94; Romano, supra note 10, at 1591–94. 
 41. BANNER, supra note 22, at 257 (describing early “self-regulation” by 
New York bankers). 
 42. Romano, supra note 10, at 1593. 
 43. Ribstein, supra note 34, at 83; Romano, supra note 10, at 1528. 
 44. Romano, supra note 10, at 1523 (“SOX was enacted in a flurry of con-
gressional activity . . . .”). 
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neurs.”45 Unfortunately, because the policy entrepreneurs tend 
to be critics of markets and corporations, bubble laws often 
“impose regulation that penalizes or outlaws potentially useful 
devices and practices and more generally discourages risk-
taking by punishing negative results and reducing the rewards 
for success.”46  
Quack corporate governance thus has real economic conse-
quences. In the mid-Naughts, three high-profile reports raised 
concerns that the United States’ dominant position in the glob-
al capital markets was eroding: the Bloomberg-Schumer Re-
port,47 the Paulson Committee Interim Report,48 and the 
Chamber Report.49 Although the reports differed in many de-
tails, each found that U.S. capital markets were becoming less 
competitive in the global market. Evidence for this decline is 
found in such factors as “(1) a decrease in new foreign listings; 
(2) a decline in IPOs; (3) an increase in going-private transac-
tions; and (4) an increase in firms going ‘dark,’ that is, deregis-
tering but not eliminating all public shareholders.”50 Each 
identified various reasons for this decline. Importantly, howev-
er, all three identified SOX as one of the causal factors. The 
Bloomberg-Schumer Report, for example, found that SOX sec-
tion 404 “posed unintended negative consequences for US com-
petitiveness,” while providing general support for other aspects 
of SOX.51 Although the Paulson Committee also thought SOX 
had made some key improvements, it too concluded that “the 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Ribstein, supra note 34, at 83. 
 47. See MCKINSEY & CO., SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP (2007) [hereinafter BLOOMBERG-SCHUMER 
REPORT], available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf. 
 48. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION (2006) [hereinafter PAULSON 
COMMITTEE INTERIM REPORT]. The Committee on Capital Markets Regula-
tion—or, as it is better known, the Paulson Committee—subsequently issued a 
follow-up report identifying thirteen competitive measures that the Committee 
tracks on a quarterly basis. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE 
COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKET (2007) [hereinaf-
ter PAULSON COMMITTEE REPORT], available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/ 
pdfs/The_Competitive_Position_of_the_US_Public_Equity_Market.pdf. 
 49. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CAPITAL MARKETS, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, AND THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. ECONOMY (2006) [hereinafter 
CHAMBER REPORT], available at http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/ 
reports/060213capitalmarkets.pdf. 
 50. Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future?, 26 
YALE J. ON REG. 229, 251–52 (2009). 
 51. BLOOMBERG-SCHUMER REPORT, supra note 47, at 97. 
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implementation of SOX [section] 404 . . . has produced a regime 
that is overly expensive.”52 Finally, the Chamber likewise ar-
gued that section 404 “has proven tremendously costly by re-
quiring companies to commit extraordinary resources (in time, 
management and staff resources, and money) to collect, review, 
and analyze data. These excessive and unnecessary costs dam-
age competitiveness and, ultimately, the interests of inves-
tors.”53 
A number of academic studies have likewise concluded that 
SOX created significant new costs that have had a deleterious 
effect on the economy and the capital markets. Several studies 
report that the increased costs associated with SOX are one 
reason for an increase in the number of public corporations de-
ciding to go private.54 The most comprehensive studies have 
found that the costs associated with SOX negatively impacted 
foreign firms and encouraged them to delist from U.S. capital 
markets.55 In sum, as Romano concludes her review of the evi-
dence: 
SOX . . . adversely affected U.S. exchanges through the loss of small-
firm listings. The contraction in investing opportunities has, no doubt, 
adversely affected U.S. investors as well, as they would have to bear 
currency risk and the other transaction costs of investing abroad 
rather than domestically in order to invest in such firms. In sum, a 
fair reading of the empirical literature investigating U.S. capital-
market competitiveness post-SOX indicates, at a minimum, that the 
statute has negatively impacted the stock exchanges’ competitiveness 
due to losses of small-firm listings. Those are also the firms that have 
been shown to encounter the greatest proportionate operating cost in-
crease due to SOX, in the literature documenting the changing cost of 
being a public company post-enactment.56 
As we have seen, of course, SOX was not the first example of a 
deleterious bubble law. As we shall see in the next Part, it also 
was not the last. 
 
 52. PAULSON COMMITTEE INTERIM REPORT, supra note 48, at xiii. 
 53. CHAMBER REPORT, supra note 49, at 14. 
 54. E.g., Stanley B. Block, The Latest Movement to Going Private: An Em-
pirical Study, J. APPLIED FIN., Spring/Summer 2004, at 36, 36; Ellen Engel et 
al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, 44 J. ACCT. & 
ECON. 116, 117, 142 (2007); Christian Leuz et al., Why Do Firms Go Dark? 
Causes and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations, 45 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 181, 182–83, 204–06 (2008). 
 55. Romano, supra note 50, at 253–54. 
 56. Id. at 255. 
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C. WASHINGTON OR DOVER? 
SOX and Dodd-Frank bring to the fore the question of 
whether we should prefer Washington to Dover as the principal 
regulator of corporate governance. If so, we should criticize 
those acts for not having gone far enough in displacing state 
law. If not, of course, we should criticize them for representing 
the latest moves in a creeping federalization of corporate gov-
ernance law. 
1. Does Delaware Compete Horizontally? 
The basic case for federalizing corporate law rests on the 
so-called race-to-the-bottom hypothesis. As the theory goes, 
states compete in granting corporate charters.57 After all, the 
more charters the state grants, the more franchise and other 
taxes it collects.58 Because it is corporate managers who decide 
on the state of incorporation, states compete by adopting stat-
utes favoring the interests of corporate managers vis-à-vis oth-
er corporate stakeholders.59 As the clear winner in this state 
competition, Delaware is usually presented as the poster child 
for bad corporate governance law.60 
A competing story accepts that states compete for corpo-
rate charters, but argues that this competition leads to a “race 
to the top.”61 As the theory goes, investors will not purchase, or 
at least not pay as much for, securities of firms incorporated in 
states that cater too excessively to management.62 Lenders will 
 
 57. For the seminal work in the field, which coined the phrase “race for 
the bottom,” see William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections 
upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974).  
 58. See id. at 684 (opining that “there is no public policy left in Delaware 
corporate law except the objective of raising revenue”). 
 59. See id. at 672–90 (analyzing various Delaware statutes and cases pur-
portedly favoring management vis-à-vis shareholders). 
 60. See id. at 705 (asserting that Delaware is “in the lead” of the race to 
the bottom). 
 61. The seminal article here is Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Share-
holder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 
254–58 (1977). Judge Winter later moderated the strength of his claim in 
Ralph K. Winter, The “Race for the Top” Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1528–29 (1989). 
 62. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Mysterious 
Race to the Bottom/Top, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 393 (2005) (explaining 
that the race-to-the-bottom theory asserts that “rational investors should dis-
count the amounts they are willing to pay for the company’s stock to reflect their 
view of the likelihood of managers working for shareholders and the adequacy 
of protection against future changes of heart. Since the value of stock is de-
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not lend to such firms without compensation for the risks posed 
by management’s lack of accountability. As a result, those 
firms’ cost of capital will rise, while their earnings will fall.63 
Among other things, such firms thereby become more vulnera-
ble to a hostile takeover and subsequent management purges.64 
Corporate managers therefore have strong incentives to incor-
porate the business in a state offering rules preferred by inves-
tors. Competition for corporate charters thus should deter 
states from adopting excessively pro-management statutes.65 
Some recent evidence, however, suggests that the basic 
premise of both stories (i.e., that states compete actively for 
corporate charters) is wrong.66 Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Co-
hen, for example, argue that: 
[T]he conventional view regards incorporation choice as a “pure” 
choice of a legal regime, based on only a comparison of states’ corpo-
rate law systems and a judgment on which of those systems would be 
best for the firm. . . . On this view, all states are viewed as “selling” 
their corporate law system to all publicly traded firms, and not espe-
cially to the firms located in them.67 
They then assert that their study disproves that conventional 
view, arguing that their findings “cast substantial doubt on the 
proposition that there is a vigorous competition among states 
over corporate charters.”68 
 
pendent on its future returns, rational IPO investors should price protections 
that will inure to the benefit of later secondary market investors as well.”).  
 63. See id. (explaining that race-to-the-bottom theorists believe that 
“[m]anagers who convince the financial market that they will work for share-
holders, not themselves or other corporate participants, will be able to obtain 
investment capital at far lower cost than competitors who do not”). 
 64. Id. at 393–94. 
 65. See Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bank-
ruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1157–58 (2006) (“As a result, [race-to-the-
top theorists] argue, managers’ private incentives will be aligned with the in-
centives of shareholders to maximize firm value rather than their private in-
terests, creating a natural incentive to incorporate in the state that offers the 
most-efficient law that tends to maximize firm value, rather than states that 
permit managerial agency costs.”). 
 66. E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Lei-
surely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE 
L.J. 553, 574–76 (2002); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State 
Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 681 (2002). 
 67. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to In-
corporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 396 (2003). 
 68. Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Not-So-Fierce Rivalry, DAILY DEAL, 
Jan. 31, 2003, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/pdfs/ 
2003.bebchuk-cohen.not-so-fierce-rivalry.pdf; see also Bebchuk & Hamdani, 
supra note 66, at 555 (“The alleged vigorous race among states vying for incor-
porations . . . simply does not exist.”). 
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Bebchuk and Cohen’s chosen foil, however, is a caricature 
of the race hypothesis. No one ever claimed that, say, a Los An-
geles-based lawyer sits down and thumbs through all fifty 
states’ corporation statutes before deciding where to incorpo-
rate a client. Instead, a fairer picture of the conventional view 
is that each state views itself as competing with Delaware, not 
with the other forty-eight. The claim that states compete not to 
attract incorporations but rather to retain local businesses 
finds support in the evidence that ninety-seven percent of all 
U.S. public corporations are incorporated either in their home 
state or Delaware.69 
A theory of home state versus Delaware competition also 
finds support from a behavioral economic analysis of the role 
lawyers play in choosing the state of incorporations. Lawyers 
are subject to the same bounded rationality constraints every-
one else is, as well as the familiar incentives of agency cost eco-
nomics.70 Under such conditions, lawyers naturally will adopt a 
decisionmaking heuristic,71 with home state versus Delaware 
being far and away the most logical heuristic for them to 
choose. 
In other words, even if state competition is more of a brisk 
walk than a race, Delaware still competes.72 Because of its 
small population and economy, Delaware is uniquely able to re-
ly on franchise fees to fund a considerable portion of its gov-
ernment. In fact, Delaware generates $750–800 million per 
year in franchise taxes, which amounts to a quarter of the 
state’s budget.73 This income flow is of great benefit to Dela-
ware, but it also puts Delaware at risk. If Delaware were to 
make disadvantageous changes in its law, some firms incorpo-
rated there would leave and other firms would not migrate into 
Delaware. If Delaware law became sufficiently unattractive to 
 
 69. David M. Wilson, Climate Change: The Real Threat to Delaware Cor-
porate Law, Why Delaware Must Keep a Watchful Eye on the Content of Politi-
cal Change in the Air, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 481, 489 (2010). 
 70. For sources discussing bounded rationality effects on parties and law-
yers, see generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of 
Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996), which discusses constraints and in-
centives faced by counsel. 
 71. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974) (describing the 
use of heuristics in decisionmaking). 
 72. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Shrinking Half-Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
125, 129 (2009) (arguing it is “indisputable” that Delaware competes, “albeit 
possibly weak[ly]”). 
 73. Wilson, supra note 69, at 489. 
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decisionmakers, another state might well decide to begin com-
peting directly and vigorously with Delaware.74 Pennsylvania 
and Nevada, for example, have long been lurking in the wings 
as potential competitors.75 The potential for such deleterious 
effects on its budget thus forces Delaware to constantly update 
and improve its law. 
As the principal interest group affecting Delaware law,76 
the local bar likewise has a strong interest in maintaining Del-
aware’s dominance. Unlike New York, Washington, or Los An-
geles, to cite but a few examples, Delaware lacks the popula-
tion, economic size, and financial centers necessary to sustain a 
large and prosperous corporate bar. The bar thus has an active 
interest in maintaining the efficiency and attractiveness of Del-
aware corporate law. 
Although the empirical evidence is hardly uncontested, 
there is substantial evidence that state competition tends to 
lead to efficient results. Roberta Romano’s event study of corpo-
rations changing their domicile by reincorporating in Delaware, 
for example, found that such firms experienced statistically 
significant positive cumulative abnormal returns.77 In other 
words, reincorporating in Delaware increased shareholder 
wealth. This finding strongly supports the race-to-the-top hy-
pothesis. If shareholders thought that Delaware was winning a 
race to the bottom, shareholders should dump the stock of firms 
that reincorporate in Delaware, driving down the stock price of 
such firms. As Romano found, however, and all of the other ma-
jor event studies confirm, there is a positive stock-price effect 
upon reincorporation in Delaware.78 
The event study findings are buttressed by a Robert Daines 
study in which he compared the Tobin’s Q of Delaware and 
non-Delaware corporations.79 Tobin’s Q is the ratio of a firm’s 
market value to its replacement cost of its assets and is a wide-
 
 74. Roe, supra note 72, at 129. 
 75. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 66, at 693, 716–22 (noting the efforts 
of Nevada and Pennsylvania, as well as Maryland, to compete with Delaware).  
 76. See Macey & Miller, supra note 28, at 506. 
 77. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation 
Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 265–73 (1985). 
 78. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM 
FOR SECURITIES REGULATION 64–73 (2002) (discussing the relevant studies 
and criticisms thereof ). 
 79. Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. 
ECON. 525 (2001). 
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ly accepted measure of firm value.80 Daines found that Dela-
ware corporations in the period 1981–1996 had a higher Tobin’s 
Q than those of non-Delaware corporations, suggesting that 
Delaware law increases shareholder wealth.81 
Additional support for the event study findings is provided 
by takeover regulation. Compared to most states, which have 
adopted multiple antitakeover statutes of ever-increasing feroc-
ity, Delaware’s single takeover statute is relatively friendly to 
hostile bidders.82 Given the clear evidence that hostile take-
overs increase shareholder wealth,83 this finding is especially 
striking. The supposed poster child of bad corporate govern-
ance, Delaware, turns out to be quite takeover friendly and, by 
implication, shareholder friendly. 
The takeover regulation evidence is especially important, 
because state antitakeover laws are the principal arrow in the 
quiver of modern race to the bottom theorists. Lucian Bebchuk 
and Allen Ferrell point out that state takeover regulation de-
monstrably reduces shareholder wealth but that most states 
have nevertheless adopted antitakeover statutes.84 Even many 
advocates of the race-to-the-top hypothesis concede that state 
regulation of corporate takeovers appears to be an exception to 
the rule that efficient solutions tend to win out.85 But so what? 
Nobody claims that state competition is perfect. The question is 
only whether some competition is better than none. Delaware’s 
relatively hospitable environment for takeovers suggests an af-
firmative answer to that question. 
 
 80. BRIAN KETTELL, VALUATION OF INTERNET AND TECHNOLOGY STOCKS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 70 (2002). 
 81. Daines, supra note 79, at 533. Although subsequent research suggests 
that this effect may not hold for all periods, see generally Guhan Subrama-
nian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004) (pre-
senting evidence that the Delaware effect disappears when examined over a 
longer time frame), Daines’ study remains an important confirmation of the 
event study data. 
 82. See Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of 
Second-Generation Takeover Legislation, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 298, 315 (1989) 
(explaining that Delaware has a weak statute whose adoption did not adverse-
ly affect stock prices of Delaware corporations). 
 83. See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 612–14 (2002) (reviewing studies on hostile takeovers). 
 84. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate 
Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 
1174 (1999). 
 85. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the 
Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 860 (1993). 
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2. Delaware’s Vertical Competition 
No one seriously doubts that Congress has the power under 
the Commerce Clause to preempt the field of corporate govern-
ance law.86 Although it has never done so, it was in the busi-
ness of piecemeal federalization long before SOX and Dodd-
Frank.87 The New Deal securities laws, for example, effectively 
displaced state law as to such matters as proxy voting and in-
sider trading.88 In this sense, both SOX and Dodd-Frank simply 
represent additional milestones in a process of gradual federal-
ization. 
We have seen, however, that, unlike state law, federal in-
trusions typically have resulted in quack corporate governance. 
We have already seen three reasons why this is so persistently 
the case. First, federal bubble laws tend to be enacted in a cli-
mate of political pressure that does not facilitate careful analy-
sis of costs and benefits.89 Second, federal bubble laws tend to 
be driven by populist anticorporate emotions.90 Finally, the 
content of federal bubble laws is often derived from prepack-
 
 86. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium 
Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 624 (2006) 
(opining that “Congress could draw on the same Commerce Clause on which it 
draws in supplementing the state system to occupy the entire field of corpo-
rate law”). 
 87. As Mark Roe explains: 
Washington makes corporate law. From 1933 to 2002, that is, from 
the passage of the securities laws to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, 
Washington has made rules governing the voting of stock and the so-
licitation of proxies to elect directors. It has made the main rules gov-
erning insider trading, stock buybacks, how institutional investors 
can interact in corporate governance, the structure of key board com-
mittees, board composition (how independent some board members 
must be), how far states could go in making merger law, how atten-
tive institutional investors must be in voting their proxies, what 
business issues and transactional information public firms must dis-
close (which often affect the structure and duties of insiders and 
managers to shareholders in a myriad of transactions), the rules on 
dual class common stock recapitalizations, the duties and liabilities of 
gatekeepers like accountants and lawyers, and more. 
Roe, supra note 31, at 10. 
 88. See John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regu-
lation: A Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531, 577 (2001) 
(“Federal regulation of proxies, tender offers, and insider trading are all argu-
ably much more integral to the substantive relationships among investors, 
firms, directors, and managers that are at the heart of corporate law, than 
they are to the disclosure-oriented emphasis of the existing federal securities 
statutes.”). 
 89. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 90. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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aged proposals advocated by policy entrepreneurs skeptical of 
corporations and markets.91 
A further concern is that ousting the states from their tra-
ditional role as the primary regulators of corporate governance 
would eliminate a valuable opportunity for experimentation 
with alternative solutions to the many difficult regulatory prob-
lems that arise in corporate law. As Justice Brandeis pointed 
out many years ago, “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the 
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citi-
zens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and eco-
nomic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”92 So 
long as state legislation is limited to regulation of firms incor-
porated within the state, as it generally is, there is no risk of 
conflicting rules applying to the same corporation. Experimen-
tation thus does not result in confusion, but instead may lead to 
more efficient corporate law rules. 
In contrast, the uniformity imposed by federal law pre-
cludes experimentation with differing modes of regulation. Ac-
cordingly, as the sphere of federal domination grows, the room 
for new and better regulatory ideas to be developed shrinks. In-
stead of the laboratories of federalism, we risk being stuck with 
rules that may well be wrong from the outset and, because 
Washington moves only in response to crises, may quickly be-
come obsolete. 
The point is not merely to restate the race-to-the-top ar-
gument. Competitive federalism promotes liberty as well as 
shareholder wealth. When firms may freely select among mul-
tiple competing regulators, oppressive regulation becomes im-
practical. If one regulator overreaches, firms will exit its juris-
diction and move to one that is more laissez-faire. In contrast, 
when there is but a single regulator, such that exit by the regu-
lated is no longer an option, an essential check on excessive 
regulation is lost. Hence, a transfer of power from Dover to 
Washington is a likely indicator of a bubble law with potential 
for quackery. 
D. SUMMARY 
In sum, this review suggests that quack corporate govern-
ance regulation will have some or all of the following features: 
 
 91. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 92. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
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1. It is a bubble law, enacted in response to a major negative eco-
nomic event. 
2. It is enacted in a crisis environment. 
3. It was a response to a populist backlash against corporations 
and/or markets. 
4. It is adopted at the federal rather than state level. 
5. It transfers power from the states to the federal government. 
6. Interest groups that are strong at the federal level but weak at the 
Delaware level support it. 
7. Typically, it is not a novel proposal, but rather a long-standing 
agenda item of some powerful interest group. 
8. The empirical evidence cited in support of the proposal is, at best, 
mixed and often shows the proposal to be unwise. 
 
All of Dodd-Frank meets the first four criteria. It was enacted 
in the wake of a massive populist backlash motivated by one of 
the worst economic crises in modern history.93 As we will see in 
the next Part, each corporate governance provision satisfies all 
or substantially all of the remaining criteria. 
II.  QUACKERY ROUND II   
Compared to some of the proposals floated in Congress fol-
lowing the 2007–2008 financial crisis, Dodd-Frank’s corporate 
governance provisions were relatively modest. Senators Maria 
Cantwell’s and Charles Schumer’s Shareholder Bill of Rights, 
for example, would have mandated the use of majority voting in 
the election of directors.94 It also would have banned the use of 
staggered boards of directors and required creation of board-
level risk management committees.95 None of these provisions 
made it into the final Dodd-Frank Act. Other provisions of the 
Cantwell-Schumer bill made it into Dodd-Frank only in a much 
weakened form. Instead of instructing the SEC to adopt a proxy 
 
 93. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting populist aspects of 
the process). 
 94. Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, Schumer, Cantwell An-
nounce ‘Shareholder Bill of Rights’ to Impose Greater Accountability on Cor-
porate America (May 19, 2009), available at http://schumer.senate.gov/new_ 
website/record.cfm?id=313468. Specifically, they proposed that incumbent 
members of the board of directors would have “to receive at least 50% of the 
vote in uncontested elections in order [to] remain on the board.” Id. 
 95. Id. Dodd-Frank section 165 does mandate risk management commit-
tees, but only for nonbank financial services companies supervised by the Fed-
eral Reserve and bank holding companies. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 165, 124 Stat. 1376, 
1423–32 (2010). 
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access rule, Dodd-Frank merely affirms that the SEC has au-
thority to do so.96 Instead of requiring that companies separate 
the positions of CEO and chairman of the board (chairman), 
with the latter being an independent director, Dodd-Frank 
merely requires the companies disclose their policy with respect 
to filling those positions.97 Even so, however, the question re-
mains whether the provisions that survived are likely to im-
prove corporate governance. 
A. THERAPEUTIC DISCLOSURES 
Therapeutic disclosures are not intended to inform inves-
tors. Instead, they are intended to affect substantive corporate 
behavior.98 Two such provisions are contained in Dodd-Frank. 
1. Pay Disclosures 
Section 953 requires that each reporting company’s annual 
proxy statement contain a clear exposition of the relationship 
between executive compensation and the issuer’s financial per-
formance.99 It further requires disclosure of “the median of the 
annual total compensation of all employees of the issuer,” ex-
cept the CEO, the CEO’s annual total compensation, and the 
ratio of the two amounts.100 This requirement is expected to be 
hugely burdensome: 
[It] means that for every employee, the company would have to calcu-
late his or her salary, bonus, stock awards, option awards, nonequity 
incentive plan compensation, change in pension value and nonquali-
fied deferred compensation earnings, and all other compensation (e.g., 
perquisites). This information would undoubtedly be extremely time-
consuming to collect and analyze, making it virtually impossible for a 
company with thousands of employees to comply with this section of 
the Act.101 
 
 96. Compare Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act § 971 (affirming authority), with Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schu-
mer, supra note 94 (mandating adoption). 
 97. Compare Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act § 972 (requiring disclosure), with Press Release, Senator Charles E. 
Schumer, supra note 94 (mandating separation). 
 98. Cf. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and 
Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 464 (2003) 
(“The strategy of shaming is premised on actively using disclosure to influence 
corporate conduct . . . .”). 
 99. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 953. 
 100. Id. § 953(b)(1)(A). 
 101. Warren J. Casey & Richard Leu, United States: New Executive Com-
pensation Disclosures Under Dodd-Frank, MONDAQ.COM (Aug. 3, 2010), http:// 
www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=106962; see also Jean Ea-
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The Senate Committee cited the Council of Institutional 
Investors (CII) as having supported this provision.102 CII’s posi-
tion as a de facto trade association for large, activist investors 
makes it an important policy entrepreneur.103 In addition to 
thus being part of a key interest group’s agenda, however, the 
provision also should be seen as part of the populist backlash 
against corporations and markets. “The law taps into public 
anger at the increasing disparity between the faltering incomes 
of middle America and the largely recession-proof multimillion-
dollar remuneration of the typical corporate chief.”104 
2. Board Structure Disclosure 
Section 972 directs the SEC to adopt a new rule requiring 
reporting companies to disclose whether the same person, or 
different persons, holds the positions of CEO and chairman.105 
In either case, the company must disclose its reasons for doing 
so. “The legislation does not endorse or prohibit either meth-
od.”106 Even so, however, it seems likely that some policy entre-
preneurs hope that the provision will shame companies into 
separating the two positions: 
Mr. Joseph Dear, Chief Investment Officer of the California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System, on behalf of the Council of Institu-
tional Investors, wrote in testimony for the Senate Banking Commit-
tee that “Boards of directors should be encouraged to separate the 
role of chair and CEO, or explain why they have adopted another 
method to assure independent leadership of the board.”107 
If this is the effect section 972 ends up having, it will be with-
out compelling support in the empirical literature. A study by 
 
glesham & Francesco Guerrera, Pay Law Sparks ‘Nightmare’ on Wall St, FIN. 
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2010, at 1 (“The rules’ complexity means multinationals face a 
‘logistical nightmare’ in calculating the ratio, which has to be based on the 
median annual total compensation for all employees, warned Richard Susko, 
partner at law firm Cleary Gottlieb. ‘It’s just not do-able for a large company 
with tens of thousands of employees worldwide.’”). 
 102. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 135 (2010). 
 103. Cf. Jeanmarie LoVoi & Klaus Eppler, Corporate Governance, in 
PREPARATION OF ANNUAL DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 2002, at 220 (PLI Corpo-
rate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B0-018D, 2002) (“The 
Council of Institutional Investors (‘CII’) founded in 1985, is a trade association 
of over 120 pension fund members that own more than $1 trillion of invest-
ments in the United States and over 100 honorary international participants 
and educational sustainers.”). 
 104. Eaglesham & Guerrera, supra note 101, at 1. 
 105. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 972. 
 106. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 147. 
 107. Id. 
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Olubunmi Faleye, for example, finds support for the hypothesis 
that firms actively weigh the costs and benefits of alternative 
leadership structures in their unique circumstances and con-
cludes that requiring a one-size-fits-all model separating the 
CEO and chairman positions may be counterproductive.108 
Another study by James Brickley, Jeffrey Coles, and Gregg 
Jarrell found evidence “that the costs of separation are larger 
than the benefits for most large firms.”109 As John Coates 
summarizes the field, the evidence is mixed, at best: 
At least 34 separate studies of the differences in the performance of 
companies with split vs. unified chair/CEO positions have been con-
ducted over the last 20 years, including two “meta-studies.” . . . The 
only clear lesson from these studies is that there has been no long-
term trend or convergence on a split chair/CEO structure, and that 
variation in board leadership structure has persisted for decades, 
even in the UK, where a split chair/CEO structure is the norm.110 
Although Coates concludes that splitting the CEO and chair-
man positions by legislation “may well be a good idea for larger 
companies,” he further concludes that mandating such a split 
“is not clearly a good idea for all public companies.”111 
In my view, proponents of a mandatory nonexecutive 
chairman of the board have overstated the benefits of splitting 
the positions, while understating or even ignoring the costs of 
doing so. Michael Jensen identified the potential benefits in his 
1993 Presidential Address to the American Finance Associa-
tion, arguing that: “The function of the chairman is to run 
board meetings and oversee the process of hiring, firing, eval-
uating, and compensating the CEO. . . . Therefore, for the board 
to be effective, it is important to separate the CEO and chair-
man positions.”112 In fact, however, overseeing the “hiring, fir-
ing, evaluating, and compensating the CEO” is the job of the 
board of directors as a whole, not just the chairman of the 
board. 
 
 108. See Olubunmi Faleye, Does One Hat Fit All? The Case of Corporate 
Leadership Structure, 11 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 239, 239 (2007). 
 109. James A. Brickley et al., Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO 
and Chairman of the Board, 3 J. CORP. FIN. 189, 189 (1997). 
 110. Protecting Shareholders and Enhancing Public Confidence by Improv-
ing Corporate Governance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. 
of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 47–48 
(2009) (statement of John C. Coates IV, Professor of Law & Economics, Har-
vard Law School). 
 111. Id. at 49. 
 112. Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the 
Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 866 (1993). 
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To be sure, in many corporations, the chairman of the 
board is given unique powers to call special meetings, set the 
board agenda, and the like.113 In such companies, a dual CEO-
chairman does wield powers that may impede board oversight 
of his or her performance. Yet, in such companies, the problem 
is not that one person holds both posts; the problem is that the 
independent members of the board of directors have delegated 
too much power to the chairman. The solution is to adopt by-
laws that allow the independent board members to call special 
meetings, require them to meet periodically outside the pres-
ence of managers, and the like. 
Turning from the benefit side to the cost side of the equa-
tion, even if splitting the posts makes it easier for the board to 
monitor the CEO, the board now has the new problem of moni-
toring a powerful nonexecutive chairman. The board now must 
expend effort to ensure that such a chairman does not use the 
position to extract rents from the company and, moreover, that 
the chairman expends the effort necessary to carry out the 
post’s duties effectively. The board also must ensure that a dys-
functional rivalry does not arise between the chairman and the 
CEO, both of whom presumably will be ambitious and highly 
capable individuals. In other words, if the problem is “who 
watches the watchers?” splitting the two posts simply creates a 
second watcher who also must be watched. 
In addition, a nonexecutive chairman inevitably will be 
less well informed than a CEO. Such a chairman therefore will 
be less able to lead the board in performing its advisory and 
networking roles. Likewise, such a chairman will be less effec-
tive in leading the board in monitoring top managers below the 
CEO, because the chairman will not know those managers as 
intimately as the CEO. 
3. Summary 
In sum, corporate governance is not an arena in which one 
size fits all. Different firms have different governance needs. 
Boards of directors should be free to select the governance 
structures optimal for their unique firm without being shamed 
 
 113. See James Verdonik & Kirby Happer, Role of the Chairman of the 
Board, CORP. DIRECTORS F., http://www.directorsforum.com/resources/pdf/role 
-of-the-chairman-verdonik-happer.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2011) (explaining 
that “one of the duties of the Chairman is to call meetings of the Board of Di-
rectors and the shareholders” and that “Chairmen often set the agenda for 
Board meetings”). 
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by therapeutic disclosure. Yet, this is precisely what Dodd-
Frank does. 
Even setting aside the unique foibles of Dodd-Frank’s pro-
visions, which surely qualify them as quack corporate govern-
ance, therapeutic disclosure almost always qualifies as such for 
more general reasons. Seeking to effect substantive goals 
through disclosure requirements is inconsistent with the origi-
nal congressional intent behind the federal securities laws. 
When the New Deal-era Congresses adopted the Securities Act 
and the Securities Exchange Act, there were three possible 
statutory approaches under consideration: (1) the fraud model, 
which would simply prohibit fraud in the sale of securities; (2) 
the disclosure model, which would allow issuers to sell very 
risky or even unsound securities, provided they gave buyers 
enough information to make an informed investment decision; 
and (3) the blue sky model, pursuant to which the SEC would 
engage in merit review of a security and its issuer.114 The fed-
eral securities laws adopted a mixture of the first two ap-
proaches, but explicitly rejected federal merit review.115 As 
such, the substantive behavior of corporate issuers was never 
intended to be part of the federal scheme; instead, the sub-
stance of corporate governance was left to the states.116 Thera-
peutic disclosure violates that scheme by de facto preempting 
state law, which is just as problematic as preemption by sub-
stantive regulation. 
The criteria for quack corporate governance are thus satis-
fied. The various forms of therapeutic disclosure were sup-
ported by institutional investors, who are more powerful at the 
federal than state level and for whom some of these proposals 
are long-standing goals, some of the provisions de facto federal-
ize aspects of corporate governance, and the provisions are like-
ly to prove unwise from a cost-benefit perspective. 
 
 114. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 83, at 17 (describing these models). 
 115. See Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1130–31 (7th Cir. 
1993) (“Federal securities law does not include ‘merit regulation.’”); Sympo-
sium, New Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Security Offerings, 28 BUS. 
LAW. 505, 505 (1973) (“The Securities Act of 1933 was really a ‘rotten egg stat-
ute.’ You could sell all the rotten eggs you wanted if you told people fully how 
rotten they were.” (quoting panelist A.A. Sommer, Jr.)). 
 116. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 
503 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Federal securities laws frequently regulate process while 
state corporate law regulates substance.”). 
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B. PROXY ACCESS 
Dodd-Frank section 971 affirms that the SEC has authori-
ty to adopt proposed proxy access rules.117 It does not require 
that the SEC do so.118 If the SEC does so, however, Congress 
intends that the SEC should have “wide latitude in setting the 
terms of such proxy access.”119 In particular, section 971 ex-
pressly authorizes the SEC to exempt “an issuer or class of is-
suers” from any proxy access rule and specifically requires the 
SEC to “take into account, among other considerations, wheth-
er [proxy access] disproportionately burdens small issuers.”120 
Proxy access is a long-standing goal of shareholder activ-
ists, especially among the institutional investor community. 
Not surprisingly, it was supported by policy entrepreneurs from 
the CII and “[a] coalition of state public officials in charge of 
public investments, AFSCME, CalPERS, and the Investor’s 
Working Group.”121 
Section 971 probably was unnecessary. An SEC rulemak-
ing proceeding on proxy access was well advanced long before 
Dodd-Frank was adopted, so a shove from Congress was super-
fluous. Although the SEC lacks authority to regulate the sub-
stance of shareholder voting rights, proxy access almost cer-
tainly fell within the disclosure and process sphere over which 
the SEC has unquestioned authority.122 By adopting section 
971, however, Congress did preempt an expected challenge to 
any forthcoming SEC regulation.123 
 
 117. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 146 (2010) (discussing the proxy access provi-
sion, then numbered section 972). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 971(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010).  
 121. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 147. Former SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins 
observed that “[u]nions and special-interest groups successfully lobbied Con-
gress to include a provision in the recent Dodd-Frank Act to empower the SEC 
to make rules regarding proxy access.” Paul Atkins, The SEC’s Sop to Unions, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2010, at A15. The special interests he identified are “po-
litically powerful trade-union activists, self-nominated shareholder-rights ad-
vocates, [and] trial lawyers.” Id. 
 122. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Scope of the SEC’s Authority over 
Shareholder Voting Rights, ENGAGE, June 2007, at 25 (analyzing relevant case 
law and legislative history). 
 123. Broc Romanek, It’s Coming: SEC to Consider Proxy Access on Wednes-
day, CORPORATECOUNSEL.NET (Aug. 19, 2010, 7:44 AM), http://www 
.thecorporatecounsel.net/Blog/2010/08/shareholder-engagement-uk-style-recently 
-1.html (noting that “the US Chamber of Commerce may be gearing up to sue 
if the SEC approves access”). 
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In any case, on August 25, 2010, the SEC released a pro-
posed proxy access rule.124 Newly adopted Rule 14a-11 will re-
quire companies to include in their proxy materials, alongside 
the nominees of the incumbent board, the nominees of share-
holders who own at least three percent of the company’s shares 
and have done so continuously for at least the prior three 
years.125 A shareholder may only put forward a short slate con-
sisting of at least one nominee or up to twenty-five percent of 
the company’s board of directors, whichever is greater.126 Ap-
plication of the rule to small companies will be deferred for 
three years, while the SEC studies its impact.127 
Because proxy access’s effect will be to increase the num-
ber of short slates, albeit to an uncertain extent, its impact on 
corporate governance likely will be analogous to that of cumu-
lative voting. Both result in divided boards representing differ-
ing constituencies. In turn, while some firms might benefit 
from the presence of skeptical outsider viewpoints, divided 
boards are likely to be dominated by adversarial relations be-
tween the majority block and the minority of shareholder nom-
inees.128 
The likely effects of proxy access therefore will not be bet-
ter governance. It is more likely to be an increase in interper-
sonal conflict (as opposed to the more useful cognitive conflict). 
There probably will be a reduction in the trust-based relation-
ships that causes horizontal monitoring within the board to 
provide effective constraints on agency costs.129 There may also 
be an increase in the use by the majority of pre-meeting cau-
cuses and a reduction in information flows to the board as a 
whole.130 
As SEC Commissioner Troy Paredes pointed out in dissent-
ing from adoption of new Rule 14a-11, moreover, proxy access 
 
 124. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 
56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249). 
 125. See id. at 56,688. 
 126. See id. at 56,675. 
 127. See id. at 56,686–88. 
 128. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 83, at 445–46 (“Opponents of cumulative 
voting argue it produces an adversarial board . . . .”). 
 129. Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in 
Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 35–38 (2002) (discussing how trust 
and cooperation norms affect horizontal monitoring within the board). 
 130. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 83, at 445–46 (“Opponents of cumulative 
voting argue it . . . results in critical decisions being made in private meetings 
held by the majority faction before the formal board meeting.”). 
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marks a considerable displacement of state corporate law by 
federal securities regulation: “Rule 14a-11’s immutability con-
flicts with state law. Rule 14a-11 is not limited to facilitating 
the ability of shareholders to exercise their state law rights, but 
instead confers upon shareholders a new substantive federal 
right that in many respects runs counter to what state corpo-
rate law otherwise provides.”131 Commissioner Paredes further 
pointed out that: 
  The mixed empirical results do not support the Commission’s de-
cision to impose a one-size-fits-all minimum right of access. Some 
studies have shown that certain means of enhancing corporate ac-
countability, such as de-staggering boards, may increase firm value, 
but these studies do not test the impact of proxy access specifically. 
Accordingly, what the Commission properly can infer from these data 
is limited and, in any event, other studies show competing results. 
Recent economic work examining proxy access specifically is of par-
ticular interest in that the findings suggest that the costs of proxy 
access may outweigh the potential benefits, although the results are 
not uniform. The net effect of proxy access—be it for better or for 
worse—would seem to vary based on a company’s particular charac-
teristics and circumstances. 
  To my mind, the adopting release’s treatment of the economic 
studies is not evenhanded. The release goes to some length in ques-
tioning studies that call the benefits of proxy access into doubt—
critiquing the authors’ methodologies, noting that the studies’ results 
are open to interpretation, and cautioning against drawing “sharp in-
ferences” from the data. By way of contrast, the release too readily 
embraces and extrapolates from the studies it characterizes as sup-
porting the rulemaking, as if these studies were on point and above 
critique when in fact they are not.132 
SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey pointed out in dissent that 
the new rule favors a specific interest group: 
  The paradigm of a power struggle between directors and share-
holders is one that activist, largely institutional, investors assiduous-
ly promote, and this rule illustrates a troubling trend in our recent 
and ongoing rulemaking in favor of empowering these shareholders 
through, among other things, increasingly federalized corporate gov-
ernance requirements. Yet, these shareholders do not necessarily 
represent the interests of all shareholders, and the Commission be-
trays its mission when it treats these investors as a proxy for all 
shareholders.133 
 
 131. Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at 
Open Meeting to Adopt the Final Rule Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Di-
rector Nominations (“Proxy Access”) (Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www 
.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510tap.htm. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at 
Open Meeting to Adopt Amendments Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Di-
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In sum, proxy access is bad public policy, unsupported by 
the empirical evidence, and the pet project of a powerful inter-
est group. As we have seen, these are the characteristics of 
quack corporate governance. 
C. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
1. Independent Compensation Committees 
Section 952 contains a number of provisions relating to 
compensation committees, including a directive that the SEC 
direct the self-regulatory organizations (SROs) to adopt listing 
standards requiring that each member of an issuer’s compensa-
tion committee be independent.134 This provision was supported 
by CII, which argued that the bill should “ensure that compen-
sation committees are free of conflicts and receive unbiased ad-
vice.”135 Once again we see another one-size-fits-all model being 
forced on all public companies. Once again the mandate lacks 
support in the empirical evidence. Most empirical studies have 
rejected the hypothesis that compensation committee independ-
ence is positively correlated with firm performance or with im-
proved CEO compensation practices.136 
 
rector Nominations (Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/2010/spch082510klc.htm. 
 134. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 952(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1900–03 (2010). “In the context of secur-
ities regulation, the two main self-regulatory organizations are National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers and the national stock exchanges. These SROs 
are given the authority and responsibility to enforce standards and require-
ments related to their securities trading and brokerage practices . . . .” Chris-
topher M. Wood, Federalism in Securities Regulation: A Brief Introduction and 
Reflection, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 795, 796 n.7 (2006). 
Curiously, there is disagreement as to whether section 952 mandates that 
SRO listing standards require all listed companies to have an independent com-
pensation committee. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Question re Compensation 
Committees Under Dodd Frank 952, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Sept. 14, 
2010, 12:47 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/ 
2010/09/a-question-re-compensation-committees-under-dodd-frank-952.html (cit-
ing authorities on both sides of the debate). The issue has salience because 
current NASDAQ listing standards permit executive compensation decisions 
to be made either by a committee comprised solely of independent directors or 
by a majority of the independent directors. See id. (discussing relevant stand-
ards). Nothing in section 952 or the Senate Committee report addresses expli-
citly the status of those standards, thereby creating some uncertainty. See 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 952; S. REP. 
NO. 111-176 (2010). 
 135. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 135. 
 136. See Iman Anabtawi, Explaining Pay Without Performance: The Tour-
nament Alternative, 54 EMORY L.J. 1557, 1582–83 (2005) (reviewing studies). 
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2. Clawbacks 
Dodd-Frank section 954 adds a new section 10D to the Se-
curities Exchange Act, pursuant to which the SEC is instructed 
to direct the SROs to require their listed companies to disclose 
company policies for clawing back incentive-based compensa-
tion paid to current or former executive officers in the event of 
a restatement of the company’s financials due to material non-
compliance with any federal securities law financial reporting 
requirement.137 Issuers failing to adopt such a policy must be 
delisted.138 The requisite policy must provide for clawing back 
any “excess” compensation any such executive officer received 
during the three-year period prior to the date on which the is-
suer was obliged to issue the restatement.139 Excess compensa-
tion is defined as the difference between what the executive 
was paid and what the executive would have received if the fi-
nancials had been correct.140 
Section 954 is seriously flawed in a number of respects. On 
the one hand, as a deterrent to financial reporting fraud and 
error, it is overinclusive. It encompasses all executive officers, 
without regard to their responsibility or lack thereof for the fi-
nancial statement in question. Some innocent executives there-
fore will have to forfeit significant amounts of pay. On the other 
hand, it is underinclusive. Executive officers include an issuer’s 
“president, any vice president . . . in charge of a principal busi-
ness unit, division or function . . . , any other officer who per-
forms a policy making function or any other person who per-
forms similar policy making functions.”141 As the Senate 
Committee acknowledged, the policy therefore applies only to a 
“very limited number of employees.”142 The trouble with this 
limitation is that “decisions of individuals such as proprietary 
traders, who may well not be among” an issuer’s executive of-
ficers, nevertheless “can adversely affect, indeed implode, a 
firm.”143 
 
 137. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 954. 
 138. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 135. 
 139. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 954. 
 140. Id. 
 141. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-7 (2010). 
 142. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 136. 
 143. Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensa-
tion: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 366 
(2009). 
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Another concern is the high probability of unintended con-
sequences. In response to SOX’s much narrower clawback pro-
vision, “companies increased non-forfeitable, fixed-salary com-
pensation and decreased incentive compensation, thereby 
providing insurance to managers for increased risk.”144 Because 
current federal policy seeks to promote pay-for-performance, 
mandatory clawbacks undermine that goal.145 There is a signif-
icant risk, moreover, that other unintended consequences will 
develop in light of the “many ambiguities in the legislative lan-
guage which will have to be clarified in implementing SEC reg-
ulations, e.g.[,] is it retroactive, how to calculate recoverable 
amount, the dates during which the recovery must be 
sought.”146 
3. Say-on-Pay 
Dodd-Frank section 951 creates a new section 14A of the 
Securities Exchange Act, pursuant to which reporting compa-
nies must conduct a shareholder advisory vote on specified ex-
ecutive compensation not less frequently than every three 
years.147 At least once every six years, shareholders must vote 
on how frequently to hold such an advisory vote (i.e., annually, 
biannually, or triannually).148 The compensation arrangements 
subject to the shareholder vote are those set out in Item 402 of 
Regulation S-K.149 In addition, a shareholder advisory is re-
quired of golden parachutes.150 The vote must be tabulated and 
disclosed, but is not binding on the board of directors.151 The 
vote shall not be deemed either to effect or affect the fiduciary 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. (“As critics of executive compensation, including President Oba-
ma, object to large pay packages that are independent of performance, firms’ 
adaptation to the clawback provisions had precisely the opposite effect of what 
they would wish to see of a pay package.”). 
 146. Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Making Sense Out of “Clawbacks,” HARVARD L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 13, 2010, 4:10 PM), http:// 
blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/08/13/making-sense-out-of-clawbacks/. 
 147. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–900 (2010). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. (requiring a vote “to approve the compensation of executives, 
as disclosed pursuant to section 229.402 of title 17, Code of Federal Regula-
tions, or any successor thereto”). 
 150. See id.  
 151. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 133 (2010). 
  
1808 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1779 
 
duties of directors.152 The SEC is given exemption power and is 
specifically directed to evaluate the impact on small issuers.153 
Say-on-pay was highly contentious. Supporters included 
the CII, “the Consumer Federation of America, AFSCME, and 
the Investor’s Working Group.”154 It is a long-standing goal of 
the AFL-CIO.155 Business groups, such as the Business Round-
table156 and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, have long opposed 
it.157 
a. Is There an Executive Compensation Crisis? 
The core argument for say-on-pay is that executive com-
pensation has been decoupled from the financial performance of 
their firms. As the Senate committee put it, “[t]he economic cri-
sis revealed instances in which corporate executives received 
very high compensation despite the very poor performance by 
their firms.”158 
House Report 110-88, which accompanied an earlier say-
on-pay bill, explained that in FY 2005 the median CEO among 
1400 large companies “received $13.51 million in total compen-
sation, up 16 percent over FY 2004.”159 The Report also noted 
that “in 1991, the average large-company CEO received approx-
imately 140 times the pay of an average worker; in 2003, the 
ratio was about 500 to 1.”160 Yet, it is difficult to describe those 
amounts as constituting a crisis in and of themselves when 
many occupations today carry even larger rewards. The high-
est-paid investment banker on Wall Street in 2006 was Lloyd 
Blankfein of Goldman Sachs, for example, who “earned $54.3 
million in salary, cash, restricted stock and stock options,”161 or 
about four times the median CEO salary from the year before. 
But the pay of some private hedge fund managers dwarfed even 
 
 152. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951. 
 153. Id. 
 154. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 134. 
 155. Doug Halonen, Retirement Policy Is Unlikely to Be Part of GOP Con-
vention, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Sept. 1, 2008, at 3. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Del Jones, CEOs Openly Pull Against Say-on-Pay, USA TODAY, July 
16, 2009, at 1B, available at 2009 WLNR 13548976. 
 158. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 133. 
 159. H.R. REP. NO. 110-88, at 3 (2007). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Jenny Anderson & Julie Creswell, Make Less than $240 Million? 
You’re Off Top Hedge Fund List, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007, at A1, available at 
2007 WLNR 7686080. 
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that sum. Hedge fund manager James Simons earned $1.7 bil-
lion in 2006, for example, and two other hedge fund managers 
also cracked the billion dollar level that year.162 
Instead, the crisis argument rests on two premises. First, 
that top executive compensation is not set through arms-length 
negotiations. Instead, top managers have effectively captured 
the boards of directors who nominally set their pay.163 Second, 
“managers have used their influence [over corporate boards of 
directors] to obtain higher compensation through arrangements 
that have substantially decoupled pay from performance.”164 In 
other words, the executive compensation scandal is not the rap-
id growth of management pay in recent years, but rather the 
failure of compensation schemes to award high pay only for top 
performance. 
The literature on this topic is immense. Suffice it to say 
that the foregoing claims are highly contested. There is evi-
dence, for example, “that in many settings where ‘managerial 
power’ exists, observed [compensation] contracts anticipate and 
try to minimize the costs of this power, and therefore may in 
fact be written optimally.”165 A careful review of the empirical 
literature concludes that “most of the results” cited by those 
who “postulate managerial dominance turn out to be consistent 
with a less sinister explanation.”166 In addition, “CEO compen-
sation has risen sharply (and paradoxically) at a time when 
boards are increasing their independence, CEO tenure is de-
clining, and accounting rules are becoming more transparent. 
Under the managerial power approach, which requires tame 
boards, entrenched CEOs, and opaque reporting, this should 
not happen.”167 A third study found that “[t]he sixfold increase 
in CEO pay between 1980 and 2003 can be attributed to the 
sixfold increase in market capitalization of large U.S. compa-
 
 162. Id. 
 163. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 5 (2004) (arguing that 
“directors have been influenced by management, sympathetic to executives, 
insufficiently motivated to bargain over compensation, or simply ineffectual in 
overseeing compensation”). 
 164. Id. at 6. 
 165. John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without 
Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1160 (2005). 
 166. Franklin G. Snyder, More Pieces of the CEO Compensation Puzzle, 28 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 129, 165 (2003). 
 167. Id. at 133 (footnotes omitted). 
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nies during that time period.”168 In other words, CEOs got rich-
er because their shareholders got richer. Indeed,  
[t]he fact that shareholders of U.S. companies earned higher returns 
even after payments to management does not support the claim that 
the U.S. executive pay system is designed inefficiently; if anything, 
shareholders appear better off with the U.S. system of executive pay 
than with the systems that prevail in other countries.169 
In sum, there has not been closure on the executive com-
pensation debate. The core premise behind say-on-pay remains, 
at best, unproven. As such, the case for regulation simply had 
not been made. 
b. Will It Work? 
The effectiveness of say-on-pay is highly contested. The 
Senate committee report argued that: 
The UK has implemented “say on pay” policy. Professor John Coates 
in testimony for the Senate Banking Committee stated that the UK’s 
experience has been positive; “different researchers have conducted 
several investigations of this kind . . . . These findings suggest that 
say-on-pay legislation would have a positive impact on corporate gov-
ernance in the U.S. While the two legal contexts are not identical, 
there is no evidence in the existing literature to suggest that the dif-
ferences would turn what would be a good idea in the UK into a bad 
one in the U.S.”170 
In contrast, Professor Jeffrey Gordon argues that the U.K. 
experience with say-on-pay makes a mandatory vote a “dubious 
choice.”171 First, because individualized review of compensation 
schemes at the 10,000-odd U.S. reporting companies will be 
prohibitively expensive, activist institutional investors will 
probably insist on a narrow range of compensation programs 
that will force companies into something close to a one-size-fits-
all model.172 Second, because many institutional investors rely 
on proxy advisory firms, a very small number of gatekeepers 
will wield undue influence over compensation.173 This likely 
 
 168. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So 
Much?, 123 Q.J. ECON. 49, 50 (2008). 
 169. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate 
Governance: What’s Right and What’s Wrong 4 (European Corporate Govern-
ance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 23/2003, 2003), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=441100. 
 170. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 134 (2010). 
 171. Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Expe-
rience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-in, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 325 
(2009). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 326. 
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outcome seriously undercuts the case for say-on-pay. As we 
have seen, proponents of say-on-pay claim it will help make 
management more accountable, but they ignore the probability 
that say-on-pay really will shift power from boards of directors 
not to shareholders but to advisory firms like RiskMetrics.174 
There is good reason to think that boards are more accountable 
than those firms. “The most important proxy advisor, RiskMet-
rics, already faces conflict issues in its dual role of both advis-
ing and rating firms on corporate governance that will be great-
ly magnified when it begins to rate firms on their compensation 
plans.”175 Ironically, the only constraint on RiskMetrics’ conflict 
is the market (i.e., the possibility that they will lose credibility 
and therefore customers), “the very force most shareholder 
power proponents claim [does not] work when it comes to hold-
ing management accountable.”176 
As for the U.K. experience, Gordon’s review of the empiri-
cal evidence finds that shareholders almost invariably approve 
the compensation packages put to a vote.177 He further finds 
that while there is some evidence that pay-for-performance 
sensitivity has increased in the United Kingdom, executive 
compensation has continued to rise “significantly” there.178 In-
deed, the growth rate for long-term incentive plans has been 
“higher” than in the United States.179 
Gordon concludes “that ‘say on pay’ has some downsides 
even in the United Kingdom, downsides that would be exacer-
bated by a simple transplant into the United States.”180 He rec-
ommended that any federal rule be limited to an opt-in regime 
or, if some form of mandatory regime was politically necessary, 
 
 174. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Will the Unaccountable Power of RiskMet-
rics Put Teeth in the Dodd Bill’s Say on Pay Provision?, PROFESSOR-
BAINBRIDGE.COM (Apr. 22, 2010, 4:32 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/ 
professorbainbridgecom/2010/04/will-the-unaccountable-power-of-risk-metrics 
-put-teeth-in-the-dodd-bills-say-on-pay-provision.html. 
 175. Gordon, supra note 171, at 326 (footnote omitted). 
 176. Bainbridge, supra note 174. 
 177. See Gordon, supra note 171, at 341 (explaining that “shareholders in-
variably approve the Directors Remuneration Report, with perhaps eight 
turndowns across thousands of votes over a six-year experience”). The same is 
true of the limited U.S. experience with voluntary say-on-pay. See id. at 339 
(“The number of proposals grew only moderately [in 2008], to seventy, and the 
level of shareholder support has remained at the same level, approximately 
forty-two percent.”). 
 178. Id. at 341. 
 179. Id. at 344. 
 180. Id. at 367. 
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that it be limited to the very largest firms.181 As we have seen, 
Congress went in a different direction, despite the considerable 
uncertainty as to whether say-on-pay will be effective. 
c. The Departure from Board Centrism 
There is no more basic question in corporate governance 
than “who decides.” Is a particular decision or oversight task to 
be assigned to the board of directors, management, or share-
holders? Corporate law generally adopts what I have called “di-
rector primacy.”182 It assigns decisionmaking to the board of di-
rectors or the managers to whom the board has properly del-
egated authority.183 Under state law, executive compensation is 
no exception.184  
To be sure, the say-on-pay provision contained in Dodd-
Frank is only an advisory vote.185 Yet, the logic of an advisory 
vote on pay seems to be the same as that underlying precatory 
shareholder proposals made pursuant to Rule 14a-8. Even 
though they are not binding, they are nevertheless expected to 
affect director decisions.186 
Say-on-pay is just one small piece of the shareholder activ-
ists’ agenda,187 moreover. As we have seen, Dodd-Frank 
presages the accomplishment of another of those agenda items 
by authorizing the SEC to go forward with proxy access.188 
 
 181. See id. (setting out recommendations). Gordon’s proposal finds support 
in a recent behavioral economics laboratory experiment finding that say-on-
pay has a more positive impact on investors when it is voluntarily effected by 
companies than when it is mandated. See Kendall O. Bowlin et al., Say-on-Pay 
and the Differential Effects of Voluntary Versus Mandatory Regimes on Inves-
tor Perceptions and Behavior 3–4 (Aug. 16, 2010) (unpublished meeting pa-
per), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1659862. 
 182. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 83, at 198. 
 183. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) (stating that the corpora-
tion’s “business and affairs . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors”). 
 184. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 55–60 
(Del. 2006) (analyzing whether the board and the compensation committee 
complied with their fiduciary duties in setting executive compensation). 
 185. See supra text accompanying note 151. 
 186. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Sharehold-
er Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1065–67 
(1999) (finding some support for the claim that nonbinding shareholder pro-
posals affect compensation outcomes). 
 187. See supra text accompanying notes 154–55 (noting activist investor 
support for say-on-pay). 
 188. See supra text accompanying note 121 (noting activist investor sup-
port for proxy access). 
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Another of the activists’ agenda items was recently achieved 
when states began changing their corporation statutes to allow 
the use of majority voting in election of directors.189  
[In sum, there have been] a number of important developments—
including increased institutional investing, changes in federal proxy 
law, the creation of shareholder advisory services, the rise of activist 
hedge funds, and financial innovations that can magnify activists’ vot-
ing power—[that] have worked together to significantly shift the bal-
ance of power in public firms away from executives and boards and 
toward activist shareholders. The trend seems likely only to continue 
as would-be reformers push to increase shareholder power further.190 
Because even an advisory say-on-pay vote is part of this pack-
age of what Cardozo called, albeit in a different context, “the 
‘disintegrating erosion’ of particular exceptions”191 by which di-
rector primacy is slowly being undermined, it is worth remind-
ing ourselves why board-centric corporate governance has val-
ue. 
The case for board centrism is grounded in Kenneth Ar-
row’s work on organizational decisionmaking, which identified 
two basic decisionmaking mechanisms: “consensus” and “au-
thority.”192 Organizations use some form of consensus-based 
decisionmaking when each voting stakeholder in the organiza-
tion has comparable access to information and similar inter-
ests.193 In the absence of information asymmetries and conflict-
ing interests, collective decisionmaking can take place at 
relatively low cost.194 In contrast, organizations resort to au-
thority-based decisionmaking structures where stakeholders 
have conflicting interests and asymmetrical access to informa-
tion.195 In such organizations, information is funneled to a cen-
 
 189. See J.W. Verret, Pandora’s Ballot Box, or a Proxy with Moxie? Majori-
ty Voting, Corporate Ballot Access, and the Legend of Martin Lipton Re-
Examined, 62 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1009–12 (2007) (discussing a 2006 amendment 
to Delaware’s corporate statute authorizing bylaw amendments relating to 
majority voting for the board of directors). 
 190. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Share-
holders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1261 (2008). 
 191. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (quoting Wendt v. 
Fischer, 154 N.E. 303, 304 (N.Y. 1926)). 
 192. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68–70 (1974). 
 193. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 83, at 192 (discussing preconditions for 
the use of consensus). 
 194. See id. (discussing decisionmaking in partnerships). 
 195. See id. at 201 (discussing preconditions for use of authority-based de-
cisionmaking). 
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tral agency empowered to make decisions binding on the whole 
organization.196 
Small business firms typically use some form of consensus 
decisionmaking.197 As firms grow in size, however, consensus-
based decisionmaking systems become less practical and, by 
the time we reach the publicly held corporation, their use be-
comes essentially impractical.198 Hence, it is hardly surprising 
that “a publicly held corporation’s decisionmaking structure is 
principally an authority-based one.”199 Shareholders have nei-
ther the information nor the incentives necessary to make 
sound decisions on either operational or policy questions.200 
Overcoming the collective action problems that prevent mean-
ingful shareholder involvement would be difficult and costly.201 
Rather, shareholders should prefer to irrevocably delegate deci-
sionmaking authority to some smaller group.202 
Granted, the resulting “separation of ownership from con-
trol produces a condition where the interests of owner and of 
ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge.”203 Corporate 
governance therefore necessarily must include measures by 
which to hold directors and managers accountable, of which 
shareholder voting is one.204 In a complete theory of the firm, 
neither discretion nor accountability can be ignored, because 
both promote values essential to the survival of business organ-
 
 196. See id. (noting the use of a “central office”). 
 197. See id. at 192 (discussing partnerships). 
 198. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory 
Management: An Organizational Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 
1055–75 (1998) (explaining the necessity of authority-based governance in 
public corporations). 
 199. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 83, at 192. 
 200. See Bainbridge, supra note 198, at 1057–60 (identifying the conflicting 
interests and access to information of corporate constituents). 
 201. Id. at 1056. 
 202. As Arrow explains, under conditions of disparate access to information 
and conflicting interests, it is “cheaper and more efficient to transmit all the 
pieces of information to a central place” and to have the central office “make the 
collective decision and transmit it rather than retransmit all the information on 
which the decision is based.” ARROW, supra note 192, at 68–69. In the dominant 
M-form corporation, the board of directors and the senior management team 
function as that central office. See Bainbridge, supra note 198, at 1009 (dis-
cussing M-form corporations). 
 203. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1932). 
 204. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. 
Ch. 1988) (“The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon 
which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”). 
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izations.205 At the same time, however, the power to hold to ac-
count is ultimately the power to decide.206 Managers therefore 
cannot be made more accountable without undermining their 
discretionary authority. Establishing the proper mix of discre-
tion and accountability thus emerges as the central corporate 
governance question. Unfortunately, it is also a question no one 
in Congress appears to have pondered in connection with say-
on-pay; instead, only accountability concerns seem to have mat-
tered.207 
4. Summary 
Dodd-Frank’s executive compensation provisions are yet 
another example of quack corporate governance. They were 
strongly supported by institutional investors. In particular, 
say-on-pay is a long-standing institutional investor agenda 
item. They federalize matters previously left to state corporate 
law. They do so without strong empirical support. They are in-
consistent with the board-centric model that has been the 
foundation of the U.S. corporate governance system’s success. 
D. THE SUSPECT POLICY ENTREPRENEURS 
As already noted, the question of why the financial crisis of 
2007–2008 occurred is beyond the scope of this work.208 It 
seems clear, however, that systemic flaws in the corporate gov-
ernance of Main Street corporations were not a causal factor in 
the housing bubble, the bursting of that bubble, or the subse-
quent credit crunch. To the contrary, “[a] striking aspect of the 
stock market meltdown of 2008 is that it occurred despite the 
strengthening of U.S. corporate governance over the past few 
decades and a reorientation toward the promotion of share-
holder value.”209 The problem necessitating remedial action 
was the need to address the moral hazard inherent in the idea 
that some firms were too big to fail.210 
 
 205. See Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. 
LAW. 461, 463–64 (1992). 
 206. See ARROW, supra note 192, at 77–78. 
 207. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 133–34 (2010) (discussing the need for 
legislation). 
 208. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
 209. Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 
Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1, 2 (2009). 
 210. See id. at 5 (“[A] case could be made that strict corporate governance 
requirements should be imposed on financial firms apparently ‘too big to fail.’ 
Subject to this potentially important caveat, however, . . . lawmakers should 
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What about Wall Street firms’ corporate governance, how-
ever? Assuming for the sake of argument that flaws in the cor-
porate governance of banks and financial institutions were a 
causal factor in the crisis,211 that still would not explain the 
form Dodd-Frank took. Banks have a number of characteristics 
that make their corporate governance problems radically dif-
ferent than those of nonfinancial firms.212 Yet, the provisions of 
Dodd-Frank addressed herein regulate the corporate govern-
ance of all public corporations, whether they are in the finan-
cial industry or not. 
Instead, Dodd-Frank’s corporate governance provisions 
were included in the legislation because key policy entrepre-
neurs were able to hijack the legislative process to advance a 
long-standing political agenda. Specifically, as we have seen, all 
the major governance provisions were strongly supported by ac-
tivists in the institutional investor community, especially union 
and state and local pension funds, for whom such items as 
proxy access and say-on-pay were high priority agenda items.213 
It seems reasonable to assume that these same activist in-
vestors will be the shareholders most likely to make use of their 
new powers.214 The interests of these activists, however, are 
likely to differ significantly from those of retail investors or 
even other institutions. Indeed, union and state and local 
pension funds are precisely the shareholders most likely to use 
their position to self-deal (i.e., to take a non-pro rata share of 
the firm’s assets and earnings) or to otherwise reap private 
benefits not shared with other investors. With respect to union 
 
refrain from introducing wholesale changes to the corporate governance 
scheme currently in place.”). 
 211. See, e.g., Peter O. Mülbert, Corporate Governance of Banks After the 
Financial Crisis: Theory, Evidence, Reforms 8–9 (European Corporate Govern-
ance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 130/2009, 2010), available at http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=1448118 (discussing claims by legislators, regulators, and opin-
ionmakers that bank corporate governance failures contributed to the crisis). 
 212. See generally id. at 10–14 (identifying major differences).  
 213. See Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Activist Investors Rally to Reclaim Power, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2010, at A11 (describing lobbying efforts by activist in-
vestors on issues like say-on-pay and proxy access). 
 214. As I have noted elsewhere, “activism is principally the province of a 
very limited group of institutions. Almost exclusively, the activists are union 
and state employee pension funds. They are the ones using shareholder pro-
posals to pressure management. They are the ones most likely to seek board 
representation.” Stephen M. Bainbridge, Pension Funds Play Politics, TCS 
DAILY (Apr. 21, 2004), http://www.ideasinactiontv.com/tcs_daily/2004/04/pension 
-funds-play-politics.html. 
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and public pension fund sponsorship of shareholder proposals 
under existing law, for example, Roberta Romano observes: 
It is quite probable that private benefits accrue to some investors 
from sponsoring at least some shareholder proposals. The disparity in 
identity of sponsors—the predominance of public and union funds, 
which, in contrast to private sector funds, are not in competition for 
investor dollars—is strongly suggestive of their presence. Examples of 
potential benefits which would be disproportionately of interest to 
proposal sponsors are progress on labor rights desired by union fund 
managers and enhanced political reputations for public pension fund 
managers, as well as advancements in personal employment . . . . Be-
cause such career concerns—enhancement of political reputations or 
subsequent employment opportunities—do not provide a commensu-
rate benefit to private fund managers, we do not find them engaging 
in investor activism.215 
This is not just academic speculation. The pension fund of the 
union representing Safeway workers, for example, used its po-
sition as a Safeway shareholder in an attempt to oust directors 
who had stood up to the union in collective bargaining negotia-
tions.216 Union pension funds reportedly have also tried share-
holder proposals to obtain employee benefits they could not get 
through bargaining.217  
SEC Commissioner Casey echoed these concerns in her 
dissent from the SEC’s adoption of proxy access: 
I believe many [investor] activists will concede that their interests in 
proxy access do not lie solely in the ability to successfully place a 
nominee on a company’s board of directors; instead, the proxy access 
right is also an important means of obtaining leverage to seek out-
comes outside of the boardroom that may otherwise not be achieva-
ble—outcomes that are often unrelated to shareholder value maximi-
zation.218  
 
 215. Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Shareholder Activism a Val-
ued Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 231–32 
(2001) (footnote omitted). None of this is to deny, of course, that union, state, 
and local pension funds also often have interests that converge generally with 
those of investors. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning 
Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 1018, 1078–80 (1998).  
 216. See Bainbridge, supra note 214.  
 217. Id.  
 218. Casey, supra note 133. Former SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins like-
wise argues that: 
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What we have in Dodd-Frank thus is a bubble law designed to 
promote rent seeking by a powerful interest group, which is a 
defining characteristic of quack corporate governance. 
E. THE ILLOGICAL BASIC PREMISE 
The proposition that Dodd-Frank’s corporate governance 
provisions were a sop to special interests is further confirmed 
by the odd disconnect between the internal logic of those provi-
sions and the back story of the financial crisis. Consider, for ex-
ample, the question of executive compensation. Regulators 
identified executive compensation schemes that focused bank 
managers on short-term returns to shareholders as a contribut-
ing factor almost from the outset of the financial crisis.219 As 
was the case with almost all public U.S. corporations, banks 
and other financial institutions shifted in the 1990s to a much 
greater reliance on equity-based pay-for-performance compen-
sation schemes.220 The rationale for such schemes is that they 
align the risk preferences of managers and shareholders. Be-
cause managers typically hold less well-diversified portfolios 
than shareholders, having significant investments of both hu-
man and financial capital in their employers, they tend to be 
much more averse to firm-specific risk than diversified inves-
tors would prefer.221 Pay-for-performance compensation 
schemes that link managerial compensation to shareholder re-
turns are designed to counteract that inherent bias against risk 
and thus align managerial risk preferences with those of 
shareholders.222 
As already noted, shareholder activists long have com-
plained that these schemes provide pay without perfor-
mance.223 This was one of the corporate governance flaws Dodd-
Frank was intended to address, most notably via say-on-pay.224 
 
 219. See Mülbert, supra note 211, at 8. 
 220. See Gordon, supra note 171, at 363–67 (discussing compensation prac-
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 221. See GERHARD SCHROECK, RISK MANAGEMENT AND VALUE CREATION IN 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 83–86 (2002) (discussing managerial risk aversion). 
 222. Frederick Tung, The Great Bailout of 2008–09, 25 EMORY BANKR. 
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The trouble, of course, is that shareholders and society do not 
have the same goals when it comes to executive pay. Society 
wants managers to be more risk averse. Shareholders want 
them to be less risk averse, for the reasons just discussed.225 If 
say-on-pay and other shareholder empowerment provisions of 
Dodd-Frank succeed, manager and shareholder interests will 
be further aligned, which will encourage the former to under-
take higher risks in the search for higher returns to sharehold-
ers.226 Accordingly, as Christopher Bruner aptly observed, “the 
shareholder-empowerment position appears self-contradictory, 
essentially amounting to the claim that we must give share-
holders more power because managers left to themselves have 
excessively focused on the shareholders’ interests.”227 
In sum, the shareholder empowerment measures adopted 
before the crisis did nothing to prevent it and may well have 
contributed to it.228 The new provisions included in Dodd-Frank 
thus are unlikely to prevent another such crisis and may even 
increase the odds of some similar crisis induced by excessive 
risk taking. Once again, it thus seems fair to regard Dodd-
Frank as a classic example of a bubble law. 
III.  CAN ANYTHING BE DONE?   
In her critique of SOX, Roberta Romano concluded that: 
The straightforward policy implication of this chasm between Con-
gress’s action and the learning bearing on it is that the mandates 
should be rescinded. The easiest mechanism for operationalizing such 
a policy change would be to make the SOX mandates optional, i.e., 
statutory default rules that firms could choose whether to adopt. An 
alternative and more far-reaching approach, which has the advantage 
 
 225. See supra text accompanying notes 221–22. 
 226. See Carl R. Chen et al., Does Stock Option-Based Executive Compensa-
tion Induce Risk-Taking? An Analysis of the Banking Industry, 30 J. BANKING 
& FIN. 915, 943 (2006) (arguing that the structure of executive compensation 
in the banking industry precrisis induced risk taking by managers); Kose John 
& Yiming Qian, Incentive Features in CEO Compensation in the Banking In-
dustry, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 109, 109 (arguing that if execu-
tive compensation induces the interests of managers to be “closely aligned 
with equity interests in banks, which are highly leveraged institutions, [man-
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of a greater likelihood of producing the default rules preferred by a 
majority of investors and issuers, would be to remove corporate gov-
ernance provisions completely from federal law and remit those mat-
ters to the states. Finally, a more general implication concerns emer-
gency legislation. It would be prudent for Congress, when legislating 
in crisis situations, to include statutory safeguards that would facili-
tate the correction of mismatched proposals by requiring, as in a sun-
set provision, revisiting the issue when more considered deliberation 
would be possible.229 
In adopting Dodd-Frank, Congress ignored that advice. 
The federal role in corporate governance thus appears to be 
a case of what Robert Higgs identified as the ratchet effect.230 
Higgs focused on wars and other major crises. In the case of the 
former, for example, there is typically a dramatic growth in the 
size of government, accompanied by higher taxes, greater regu-
lation, and loss of civil liberties.231 Once the war ends, govern-
ment may shrink somewhat in size and power, but rarely back 
to prewar levels.232 Just as a ratchet wrench works only in one 
direction, the size and scope of government tends to move in on-
ly one direction—upwards—because the interest groups that 
favored the changes now have an incentive to preserve the sta-
tus quo, as do the bureaucrats who gained new powers and 
prestige. Hence, each crisis has the effect of ratcheting up the 
long-term size and scope of government. 
We now observe the same pattern in corporate governance. 
As we have seen, the federal government rarely intrudes in this 
sphere except when there is a crisis.233 At that point, policy en-
trepreneurs favoring federalization of corporate governance 
spring into action, hijacking the legislative response to the cri-
sis to advance their agenda.234 Although there may be some 
subsequent retreat, such as Dodd-Frank’s section 404 relief for 
small reporting companies,235 the overall trend has been for 
each major financial crisis of the last century to result in an 
expansion of the federal role. 
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The take-home lesson thus is that the states—especially 
Delaware and the drafters of the Model Business Corporation 
Act—must do a better job of playing defense. The game must be 
played in Dover, not Washington. The interest groups that 
dominate Delaware politics must anticipate possible instances 
of federal intervention and proactively preempt them through 
new legislation or case law whenever possible. In addition, they 
must develop sufficient strength in Washington to successfully 
lobby against federal intervention. To be sure, the political dy-
namics described in Part I may render such a defensive strate-
gy unavailing in times of crisis. If Delaware sits out future cri-
ses as it did in 2008, however, there will be no resistance to the 
steady federalization of corporate governance. 
  CONCLUSION   
Like their predecessors in SOX, the six key corporate gov-
ernance provisions of Dodd-Frank satisfy the key criteria of 
quack corporate governance. A powerful interest group coali-
tion centered on activist institutional investors hijacked the 
legislative process so as to achieve long-standing policy goals 
essentially unrelated to the causes or consequences of the fi-
nancial crisis that began back in 2007. Without exception, the 
proposals lack strong empirical or theoretical justification. To 
the contrary, there are theoretical and empirical reasons to be-
lieve that each will be at best bootless and most will be affirma-
tively bad public policy. Furthermore, each erodes the system of 
competitive federalism that is the unique genius of American 
corporate law by displacing state regulation with federal law. 
Unfortunately, this has become a recurring pattern whenever 
the federal government is moved to action by a new economic 
crisis. The federalization of corporate governance thus contin-
ues to creep ahead. 
